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 1 
HEGEL’S IDEALISM 
ROBERT STERN 
In an influential article on this topic, Karl Ameriks posed the question: “But can 
an interesting form of Hegelian idealism be found that is true to the text, that is 
not clearly extravagant, and that is not subject to the [charge] of triviality…?”,1 
and concluded by answering the question in the negative: “In sum, we have yet to 
find a simultaneously accurate, substantive, and appealing sense in which Hegel 
should be regarded as an idealist”.2 Other commentators on this issue have tended 
to be more positive; but then the fact that these commentators have differed 
sharply between themselves may suggest that another concern is over the 
coherence of Hegel’s position, and whether a consistent account is possible of it 
at all. 
In this article, I will consider the charges of inaccuracy, triviality, and 
extravagance that Ameriks and others have raised. Of these charges, the first two 
are obviously damaging; but it might reasonably be felt that that last is less clearly 
so (why shouldn’t a philosophical theory be extravagant?), and also that it is open 
to different readings. (For example, does it mean “not consistent with ‘common 
sense’”, or “not consistent with the findings of the sciences” – but what do these 
include?) The context for a concern of this sort, however, might well be whether 
Hegel’s position can be made consistent with Kantian objections against the 
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pretensions of metaphysics, either by respecting those objections, or at least by 
satisfactorily addressing them. The interpretative issue here is thus one of charity: 
Hegel’s position will seem reactionary and ill-informed if it appears to be 
conceived in ignorance of the work of his great predecessor. One prominent 
recent interpreter has put the worry as follows: 
More to the general and more obvious point, however, much of the standard view of how 
Hegel passes beyond Kant into speculative philosophy makes very puzzling, to the point 
of unintelligibility, how Hegel could have been the post-Kantian philosopher he 
understood himself to be; that is, how he could have accepted, as he did, Kant’s 
revelations about the fundamental inadequacies of the metaphysical tradition, could have 
enthusiastically agreed with Kant that the metaphysics of the “beyond,” of substance, and 
of traditional views of God and infinity were forever discredited, and then could have 
promptly created a systematic metaphysics as if he had never heard of Kant’s critical 
epistemology. Just attributing moderate philosophic intelligence to Hegel should at least 
make one hesitate before construing him as a post-Kantian philosopher with a precritical 
metaphysics.3 
In considering the issue of extravagance, then, I shall conceive it primarily in this 
manner, as concerning the relation between Hegel’s position and Kant’s “critical 
turn” in metaphysics. I will argue that a view of Hegel’s idealism emerges from 
Ameriks’ criticisms, which is defensible against his three charges; however, to 
make sense of it we have to see that Hegel’s conception of idealism has aspects 
that are unusual in terms of the contemporary debate, while nonetheless his 
position still has a direct bearing on it. 
I HEGEL AS A KANTIAN IDEALIST 
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The account of Hegel’s idealism which Ameriks charges with textual inaccuracy 
is the one put forward by Robert Pippin in his book on this topic,4 which has been 
widely discussed.5 
Pippin argues that Hegel’s idealism should be seen in the light of Kant’s 
turn from traditional metaphysics to critical metaphysics, a turn which Hegel 
followed and which led both him and Kant towards idealism. Simply put, Kant 
believed that metaphysics could not be carried out in the traditional rationalist 
manner, of claiming insight into the fundamental features of reality on the basis of 
a priori speculation; rather, we must direct our inquiry to the concepts we use to 
think about the world and which are necessary for us to have experience of it as 
self-conscious subjects, so that (as Pippin puts it) “[t]hereafter, instead of an a 
priori science of substance, a science of ‘how the world must be’…a putative 
philosophical science was directed to the topic of how any subject must “for 
itself’ take or construe or judge the world to be”.6 The hope was that this critical 
turn would make metaphysics more tractable and less vainglorious: we would 
now be proceeding by investigating the necessary conditions of our experience, 
rather than things in general.7 However, an obvious difficulty with this enterprise 
is the scope it leaves open for scepticism: why should we think that the concepts 
which are necessary to enable us to have experience actually correspond to the 
world? Surely, it might be objected, “[a]n inquiry into the structure of human 
thought is…something quite different from an inquiry into the structure of the 
world thought is about”,8 so how can the Kantian approach claim to be doing 
metaphysics in any sense at all? Now, one Kantian response to this worry is to 
reject the realist assumption on which it is based, namely, that such a gap between 
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mind and world could arise, and thus that there is any coherent notion of “world” 
on the basis of which the problem could be posed; rather, it is argued, notions like 
“object”, “representation”, “truth”, “knowledge”, and so on only apply within the 
conceptual scheme we are considering. This outlook is often characterised as 
“antirealism” or “internal realism”, in so far as it rejects the realist “external” 
standpoint that appears to make scepticism about conceptual schemes of genuine 
concern, but without the more strongly idealist commitment to the claim that 
things in the world are “mental” or “mind dependent” in any phenomenalist 
sense.9 
Now, according to Pippin, Hegel followed Kant in taking this critical turn, 
and thus in attempting to determine the categories necessary for a conceptual 
scheme, based on the conditions for unified self-consciousness (what Kant called 
“apperception”). However, where Kant had undermined his own position by 
allowing room for the realist notion of “things-in-themselves” as possibly lying 
outside our conceptual framework, Pippin takes Hegel’s project to be that of 
developing a more thorough-going antirealism, which would close off any such 
possibility. Thus, for Pippin, Hegel follows Kant in so far as “the issue of the 
‘determinations of any possible object’ (the classical Aristotelian category issue) 
has been critically transformed into the issue of ‘the determinations of any object 
of a possibly self-conscious judgment’”; but he goes beyond Kant in so far as “he 
has, contra Kant, his own reasons for arguing that any skepticism about such 
results (about their holding only for ‘our’ world, for self-conscious judgers ‘like 
us’) is, although logically coherent, epistemically idle”.10 Pippin thus gives 
Hegel’s idealism a strikingly Kantian interpretation and rationale: accepting the 
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lesson of Kant’s critical turn that “contrary to the rationalist tradition, human 
reason can attain nonempirical knowledge only about itself, about what has come 
to be called recently our ‘conceptual scheme’”.11 Hegel nonetheless claims also to 
be investigating the nature of reality itself in so far as no content can be given to 
the realist or sceptical thought that reality might, in fact lie “outside” of the 
scheme altogether, by showing that there can be no such “external” standpoint: 
“[W]hat Hegel is after is a way of demonstrating the ‘ultimate’ or absolute 
objectivity of the Notion not by some demonstration that being as it is in itself can 
be known to be as we conceive it to be, but that a Notionally conditional actuality 
is all that ‘being’ could intelligibly be, even for the most committed realist 
skeptic. Or, if you like, Hegel’s skeptic is co-opted into the idealist program, not 
simply ‘refuted’”.12 
There are undoubtedly many aspects of Pippin’s account of Hegel’s 
idealism that make it profound and attractive. By placing such emphasis on its 
Kantian background, and how much Hegel shared in the Kantian critique of 
traditional metaphysics, Pippin offers a reading that shows Hegel to be in tune 
with the progressive intellectual forces of his time, rather than the reactionary 
philosophical figure of some standard interpretations. Pippin also argues that 
Hegel’s position follows “immanently” from Kant’s own, suggesting that in the 
second edition version of the transcendental deduction in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, Kant himself took back his earlier strict distinction between intuition and 
understanding, so that he now argues that no representation could be given to us 
in sensuous intuition unless it were subject to the categories.13 This, according to 
Pippin, opens up the way for Hegel’s own radicalization of Kant’s transcendental 
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approach, so that “it is with the denial that a firm distinction can ever be usefully 
drawn between intuitional and conceptual elements in knowledge that distinctly 
Hegelian idealism begins, and Hegel begins to take his peculiar flight, with 
language about the complete autonomy, even freedom of ‘thought’s self-
determination’ and ‘self-acutalization’”.14 By linking Hegel to Kant in this way, 
Pippin shows how contemporary developments from Kant have every reason to 
take Hegel seriously. Pippin’s reading also casts fresh light on many of the darker 
aspects of Hegel’s texts, particularly his introductory remarks to book  III of the 
Science of Logic, where Hegel identifies his own account of the Concept or 
Notion [Begriff] with Kant’s doctrine of apperception, and in terms that seem to 
fit Pippin’s transcendental interpretation.15 Moreover, Pippin is able to offer a 
challenging account of how Hegel’s system works in general, particularly how the 
Phenomenology relates to the Logic. 
Nonetheless, Pippin’s reading remains controversial with Hegel scholars, 
where Ameriks and others have questioned its textual accuracy, and how far it 
does justice to Hegel’s actual position and procedures. It is not possible to go into 
all the details here, but one issue is fundamental, namely, whether Pippin is right 
to claim that Hegel followed Kant in attempting to deduce the categories from the 
conditions of self-consciousness, to “‘ground’ them in the ‘I’”.16 For Pippin, as 
we have seen, such “grounding” is essential to the critical turn in metaphysics, as 
no other basis for metaphysics as the nonempirical inquiry into “how the world 
must be” can be taken seriously after Kant. Nonetheless, as Pippin recognizes, in 
presenting his account of the categories in the Logic, Hegel seems to go further 
than this, in framing his argument in more straightforwardly ontological terms, 
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and so “slips frequently from a ‘logical’ to a material mode, going far beyond a 
claim about thought or thinkability, and making a direct claim about the 
necessary nature of things, direct in the sense that no reference is made to a 
“deduced” relation between thought and thing”.17 Now, Pippin argues that these 
“slips” are merely apparent.18 However, critics of Pippin’s approach are 
unconvinced and argue instead that Hegel’s position is nontranscendental, in that 
he rejects any Kantian restriction of metaphysics to a method based around the 
conditions of self-consciousness rather than of “being as such”.19 
Of course, Pippin might well reply that from a properly Kantian 
perspective, the whole idea is that there is no such distinction, which is why 
Hegel could be happy conducting his metaphysics in a transcendental manner, by 
arguing from the necessary conditions of self-consciousness. But, it would seem 
that Pippin’s critics could respond by saying that if there really is no sense to a 
radical mind-world dichotomy, why think of an investigation into the categories 
as an investigation into the conditions of self-consciousness at all, and so why 
treat the “I” (rather than “being”) as the “ground” of the inquiry? According to 
Pippin, as we have seen, Kant himself made his critical turn to the “I” because he 
believed he had reason to think that here we could establish genuinely necessary 
claims: but why is this so obviously so? Why is there any reason to think that the 
necessary conditions for apperception are any easier to establish than the 
necessary conditions for reality as such? Or even, if one has naturalistic or 
sceptical doubts about the intelligibility of necessary conditions for the latter, that 
these doubts can be removed concerning necessary conditions for the former? In 
fact, doesn’t any such expectation reveal a Cartesian privileging of the “inner” 
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over the “outer”, or “self-knowledge” over “worldly knowledge”, of the kind that 
Hegel himself seems to have rejected as suspect.20 Thus, critics of Pippin’s 
transcendental reading of Hegel can agree that Hegel is a post-Kantian in 
accepting important elements of Kant’s critique of traditional metaphysics, 
particularly as a metaphysica specialis with its focus on transcendent entities like 
God and the soul, while still arguing that Hegel is closer to Aristotle than Kant in 
conducting his inquiry ontologically, as a metaphysica generalis, for which “[t]he 
categories analysed in the Logic are all forms or ways of being…; they are not 
merely concepts in terms of which we have to understand what is”.21 
Nonetheless, even if it is accepted that Pippin is wrong to claim that Hegel 
followed Kant in attempting to “ground” the categories in the “I” as conditions 
for self-consciousness, it is still possible that he is right to treat Hegel’s idealism 
as a form of antirealism, for the two positions are logically distinct. However, 
much of the motivation for the latter comes from the former, as it is antirealism 
that gives the transcendental inquiry metaphysical teeth. And yet, without 
antirealism as a block to realist scepticism, how can Hegel claim that his Logic is 
a metaphysics?22 On what basis can he show that he is establishing the 
fundamental nature of being, in a way that will silence sceptical doubts? Here it 
might be tempting to reintroduce a form of antirealism, and thus to return to 
something like Pippin’s view of Hegel’s idealism, as a way of enabling Hegel to 
see off the sceptic. 
It is of course the case that Hegel had every confidence in his inquiries 
and that the Logic shows that it is possible to arrive at a metaphysical picture of 
the world that has a legitimate claim to truth. But is that confidence based on a 
 9 
commitment to antirealism, or the more traditional grounds that this picture has 
been thoroughly tested against all alternatives and shown to be the most 
comprehensive, cohesive, and coherent? Of course, the antirealist strategy is more 
radical than this because it makes (or tries to make) sceptical doubt senseless or 
unassertible, by closing any possible gap between how we think about the world 
and how it is.23 But what is wrong with the less radical, but also less demanding 
strategy of asking the sceptic to come up with some grounds for thinking that the 
gap really exists, by showing that we have reason to think our world-view is 
flawed in some way, where the aim would be to show the sceptic that no such 
flaw can be found, so that in this more modest sense the sceptic has no place to 
stand? Wouldn’t this render scepticism “epistemically idle”, but without any 
commitment to antirealism, as the view that any such “external” questioning is 
unintelligible simply because it is “external”? On this view, Hegel has no 
conceptual argument to rule out scepticism in advance, but, on the other hand, the 
sceptic must do more than raise just the abstract possibility of error: grounds for 
doubt must be given by showing how the picture being put forward of reality is 
mistaken, where the inquiry is successfully concluded if and when any such 
grounds have been dealt with and excluded. Seen from this perspective, both 
antirealism and sceptical realism make the same mistake, as both attempt to 
establish the necessity or impossibility of knowledge too early, by claiming to 
show prior to starting that we can or cannot succeed in coming to know how 
things are: in the face of a priori realist scepticism, the antirealist provides a priori 
reassurance. It might be argued, however, that Hegel simply sets out on the path 
of inquiry aiming to establish how things are (for why should we believe in 
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advance that we cannot?) but without seeking any sort of guarantee (for why is 
this needed, unless we have some reason for such a doubt?). 
I would therefore question Pippin’s claim that Hegel could not possibly be 
a realist, but must be committed to some form of antirealism, because he is a 
“modern philosopher” who feels compelled to make the “critical turn” as a 
response to scepticism: “This all leads Hegel into a wholly new way of resolving 
the great problem of post-Cartesian philosophy – how can we reassure ourselves 
that what initially can only be our way of taking up, discriminating, categorizing 
the world, and our criteria for evaluating deeds, can also ultimately be critically 
and reflectively transformed, secured from realist skepticism, and somehow pass 
from ‘ours’ to ‘Absolute’ status”.24 What Pippin ignores, I believe, is Hegel’s 
insight that it is fatal (and quite uncalled for) to begin with anything like the 
Kantian “instrument” model of cognition, and thus with the presupposition that 
the categories are “only our way of taking things up, discriminating, categorizing 
the world”: for this approach “presupposes that the Absolute stands on one side 
and cognition on the other”,25 while vainly struggling to close the gap. To make 
this anything more than a presupposition, we must be shown where it is that there 
is something wrong with our way of thinking, which raises the real (and not just 
abstract) doubt that it is merely “ours”, and so not related to the world; but to do 
that, we need to be shown a genuine case where that thinking breaks down, 
otherwise scepticism is just a form of paranoia, “whereby what calls itself fear of 
error reveals itself rather as fear of the truth”.26 The Phenomenology thus justifies 
the project of the Logic by showing that a series of particular arguments a sceptic 
might give to suggest that the world is unknowable are based on questionable 
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epistemological and metaphysical assumptions – from the “supersensible beyond” 
of the Understanding to the transcendent God of certain forms of religious 
consciousness – so that in removing these sceptical grounds for doubt, “pure 
science [i.e. the Logic] presupposes liberation from the opposition of 
consciousness”,27 and thus liberation from the worry that if for example we find 
“pure being” incoherent as an idea (because it seems indistinguishable from 
nothing) this just tells us something about us, and not the nature of the world 
(namely, that if anything is, it must be determinate): but there is nothing in this 
“liberation” that commits Hegel to antirealism. 
But, it might be said, even if Hegel sees no need to turn to antirealism at 
the outset of his inquiry, surely the nature of that inquiry shows that we need to be 
antirealists at the end, because how do we otherwise explain the success of our 
metaphysical investigations into the fundamental nature of reality? After all, 
hadn’t Kant been brought to see that there was something deeply mysterious 
about metaphysical knowledge, a mystery he encapsulated in the question “how is 
synthetic a priori knowledge possible”? Kant’s concern was that when we reach a 
metaphysical conclusion (such as “every event must have a cause”), we cannot do 
so either by knowing the meaning of the concepts in question (because these 
metaphysical propositions are not analytic), or “by reading it off” the world in any 
direct sense (because our only direct confrontation with the world is in sensible 
experience: and this experience tells us just that things are thus and so, but not 
that they could not be otherwise).28 The metaphysical rationalist might argue that 
we reach our metaphysical conclusions by finding that we cannot contemplate 
how things could be any other way (e.g. an event occurring without a cause). But, 
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if our metaphysical conclusions are reached on the basis of what we find 
conceivable, what we can envisage, what account can we give of how these 
conclusions come to conform to the world? Kant argued that it is unsatisfactory to 
offer as an explanation some sort of preestablished harmony between the limits of 
what we find conceivable and the limits of how things can be, as if God or some 
“third thing” ensured that the former correspond to the latter, because this leaves 
open the question of why God should have arranged things this way, and why we 
should expect him to continue to do so.29 Rather, Kant argued, we must make the 
“Copernican turn”, and accept that it is because things must conform to our 
conceptual structures that the limits of the latter can tell us about the limits of the 
former (although this knowledge only extends as far as things as they appear 
within those structures, not to things as they are in themselves). So, if Hegel is to 
claim that his Logic is a metaphysics, doesn’t he have to explain this in antirealist 
terms? 
However, it is not clear that the metaphysician need feel obliged to accept 
this Kantian way out, because he may not feel compelled to accept the terms in 
which the problem is posed in the first place. For, this rests on the assumption that 
when we accept a metaphysical proposition on the basis of our inability to 
conceive of its negation, there is some special difficulty, which is that we are 
moving from the limits of our thought to the limits of the world. But this assumes, 
Hegel would argue, that in metaphysical thinking we are limning the limits of 
what we can conceive rather than what is conceivable as such. But can we accept 
this restriction, unless we can make more sense of there being other ways of 
conceiving things than Kant can properly allow? For, there is a dilemma here for 
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the Kantian: Either he argues that it is because of the limits on what we can 
conceive that we find some ways of being to be unthinkable, where he convinces 
us that this is really down to some fact about us – but then why would we stick to 
the modal claim and not rather abandon it? Or he convinces us to stay with the 
modal claim, by arguing that it is impossible, in general (not just for us), to 
conceive of things any other way: but then if all minds must think in this way, and 
there is no way of conceiving the world differently, isn’t this now an 
extraordinary fact, the best explanation for which lies in the impossibility of 
things being any other way, thereby providing an argument for realism rather than 
antirealism? As a result, we can now see why Hegel might say that “logic”, as 
“the science of things grasped in thought”, coincides with “metaphysics”, which 
has been “taken to express the essentialities of the things”.30 
We have found, therefore, that there are interpretative and philosophical 
reasons to be doubtful about Pippin’s account of Hegel’s idealism: Hegel’s texts 
suggest he did not feel compelled by Kant’s arguments to take an antirealist turn 
in metaphysics, and the arguments that the Kantian might give to make this seem 
necessary can be reasonably resisted. We can now proceed by looking at other 
ways of understanding Hegel’s idealism. 
II HEGEL AS A MENTALISTIC IDEALIST 
As we have seen, Pippin’s treatment of Hegel’s idealism was in part a reaction 
against other accounts that he takes to raise Ameriks’ concern of “extravagance”, 
which treat Hegel as an idealist in the sense of a “spirit monist”, “who believed 
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that finite objects did not ‘really’ exist (only the Absolute Idea exists), [and] that 
this One was not a ‘substance’ but a ‘subject,’ or mental”.31 To Pippin and others, 
this kind of idealism appears to be a return to the “metaphysics of the ‘beyond’,” 
which treats the absolute mind as the transcendent cause or ground of the world, 
in a thoroughly precritical manner; they argue we should therefore hesitate before 
attributing this position to Hegel. 
Now, one way to respond to this charge of precritical “extravagance” 
might be to try to license Hegel’s position as a natural extension of Kant’s, and 
thus to claim that this interpretation (like Pippin’s) also builds on Hegel’s Kantian 
heritage, but in a way that is closer to full-blooded mentalistic or Berkeleyan 
idealism than antirealism. Thus, according to these interpretations of Hegel’s 
idealism, Kant held that the empirical world – everything in space and time – is 
mind-dependent, so that the world as we know it is nothing but an appearance. 
However, Kant retained a residual element of realism in his conception of things-
in-themselves [noumena], which exist independent of our minds and outside the 
boundaries of our knowledge. It is argued that Hegel then came to reject this 
realism as incoherent, and so radicalized Kant’s mentalistic idealism, thereby 
arriving at the doctrine of an absolute mind, in which all reality is contained as 
the experience of a supra-individual subject. On this account, then, Hegel is an 
idealist in the sense that he treats the world as thoroughly mind-dependent, a 
transformation of Kant’s merely “subjective” idealism into a form of absolute 
idealism.32 
However, one difficulty with this approach, is that in order to claim that 
this kind of Hegelian idealism is an extension of Kant’s, it is necessary to begin 
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with a mentalistic account of Kant’s idealism, which is itself problematic because 
it ignores the full complexity of Kant’s talk of “appearances” and “things-in-
themselves” and his distinction between empirical realism and transcendental 
idealism. Thus, if it is claimed that Hegel derived his idealism from a Berkeleyan 
reading of Kant, it will seem, to many, that this position is founded on a simplistic 
misunderstanding of Kantianism, and one that we no longer have any reason to 
take seriously.33 
As well as the issue of “extravagance”, there are, moreover, textual 
reasons to resist this account as a reading of Hegel. For, this account seems to 
misunderstand Hegel’s notion of “absolute mind”, which is mind that is able to 
“free itself from the connection with something which is for it an Other”, where 
“[t]o attain this, mind must liberate the intrinsically rational object from the form 
of contingency, singleness, and externality which at first clings to it”.34 Thus, 
mind for Hegel becomes absolute when it finds itself “at home in the world”, and 
thus is able to make the world intelligible to itself; but this conception in no way 
entails that as absolute, mind somehow “contains” or constitutes the world, and so 
involves treating the latter as dependent on the former in any mentalistic sense. 
Hegel would seem to reject just this position, when at one point in his lectures he 
characterizes as “spiritualism” the view which holds that “spirit is what is 
independent, true, that nature is only an appearance of spirit, not in and for itself, 
not truly real”, and comments of this view that it would be “utter foolishness to 
deny its [nature’s] reality”.35 And of course, in systematic terms, the fact that 
Nature comes before Spirit creates difficulties for the mentalistic reading. 
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But surely, it might be argued, how can Hegel be so confident that the 
Kantian (or the sceptical realist) is wrong to talk of things-in-themselves as 
outside our cognitive capacities, unless he has brought the world “within” the 
mind and so collapsed the distinction? To exclude talk of “things-in-themselves”, 
doesn’t Hegel have to believe he has some sort of guarantee that the mind will 
conform to the world, and isn’t the only way to provide that guarantee some sort 
of mentalistic idealism?36 
It is not clear, however, that this kind of guarantee is something that Hegel 
needed or sought, and thus that he felt this kind of motivation towards mentalistic 
idealism. For, Hegel’s objection to Kant’s conception of “things-in-themselves” is 
that it sets up an absolute limit to our cognitive capacities, telling us that the gap 
between mind and world cannot be bridged; but how can such a positive claim be 
made, unless something is already known about the world on the other side of the 
gap? The difficulty is that this looks like a form of skepticism that is nonetheless 
based on a metaphysical claim about what is supposed to be unknowable, and 
which can be answered by pointing out this incoherence. Or, if Kant refuses to 
make any such metaphysical claim, how can his block on our inquiries be 
motivated, as nothing can now be said about what it is we do not know?37 
However, in removing the skeptical worry here, Hegel is not thereby committing 
himself to the opposite view, that knowledge of the world is guaranteed, and that 
before we set out in our inquiries, we can be sure they will succeed; he is just 
objecting to any attempt to set an absolute barrier to that inquiry at the outset.38 
Our response here thus parallels the response we offered to the similar worry in 
the previous section: just as we found there no reason to think Hegel’s epistemic 
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optimism requires a commitment to antirealism, so here we have found it also 
doesn’t require any commitment to mentalistic idealism. 
We have thus found reason to accept Ameriks’ critical claims regarding 
this kind of idealism as a reading of Hegel: not only is it “extravagant” and so 
objectionable on that score, but it is also textually unwarranted, as Ameriks also 
recognizes.39 
III HEGEL AND THE IDEALISM OF THE FINITE 
In the face of these exegetical difficulties, it is tempting to return to Hegel’s own 
writings, and look there at what Hegel says about idealism as a philosophical 
doctrine, and see how this relates to his own position. This is a strategy Ameriks 
also tries, but he thinks it either leads us back into “extravagance”, or into the 
third of his interpretative vices, namely, “triviality”. 
If one looks at the way in which Hegel himself characterizes idealism, the 
results are certainly striking. Here is one passage where the characterization 
seems clear:40 
The proposition that the finite is ideal [ideell] constitutes idealism. The idealism of 
philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the finite has no veritable 
being [wahrhaft Seiendes]. Every philosophy is essentially an idealism, or at least has 
idealism for its principle, and the question then is how far this principle is actually 
carried out. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally does not 
recognize finitude as a veritable being [ein wahrhaftes Sein], as something ultimate and 
absolute or as something underived, uncreated, eternal. Consequently the opposition of 
idealistic and realistic philosophy has no significance. A philosophy which ascribed 
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veritable, ultimate, absolute being to finite existences as such, would not deserve the 
name of philosophy; the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, water, or matter, 
or atoms are thoughts, universals, ideal entities, not things as they immediately present 
themselves to us, that is, in their sensuous individuality – not even the water of Thales. 
For although this is also empirical water, it is at the same time also the in-itself or essence 
of all other things, too, and these other things are not self-subsistent or grounded in 
themselves, but are posited by, are derived from, an other, from water, that is they are 
ideal entities.41 
Can anything be gained in our understanding of Hegel’s idealism by considering 
passages such as these? 
Ameriks cautions against optimism here, because he think that by taking 
this passage at face value, we will end up making Hegel’s idealism merely trivial, 
as Hegel seems to be saying only that “immediate appearances point to something 
else, some non-immediate things or relations”: “The alternative to idealism [in 
this sense] is such a straw man that here the real issue becomes simply what 
specific variety of idealism one should develop”.42 The charge of triviality arises 
if by idealism Hegel merely means that the world as it presents itself immediately 
to the senses is not how the world actually is, so that the former cannot be 
ascribed any ultimate truth – the “booming, buzzing confusion” of mere sensible 
experience is not a veridical representation of reality (assuming, indeed, that this 
notion of experience is even coherent). 
Now, it would certainly seem right that if this is all that Hegel is saying 
here, Ameriks can justifiably argue that he is not saying very much. But, in 
claiming that “finite existences” lack “veritable, ultimate, absolute being”, Hegel 
would appear to be talking not about the ephemeral phenomena presented to us in 
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sensation, but ordinary concrete objects, such as this table, this tree, and so on;43 
Ameriks is therefore wrong to identify “immediate appearances” with the former 
and not the latter. There is thus enough in Hegel’s position here to overcome the 
charge of triviality, if we take his “finite existences” to be concrete individual 
objects and not just sensory appearances. 
However, Ameriks argues that if we try to escape triviality in this way, we 
expose Hegel to the opposite danger, which is extravagance. It is the threat of this 
danger that I now wish to explore, as it arises from different readings of this 
passage. 
One reading of the passage, which would return us to the kind of 
extravagant position discussed in the previous section, would be to take Hegel 
here to be characterizing idealism in mentalistic terms, as claiming that “the finite 
has no veritable being” because finite existences qua individual objects are 
dependent on an absolute mind. But, in fact this charge of extravagance is 
obviously misplaced, as in reality this passage counts against a mentalistic 
conception of Hegel’s idealism. For, we can see here that Hegel did not mean 
anything mentalistic by idealism, because if he did, it would surely have been an 
absurd exaggeration to say that “[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism”, as 
mentalistic idealism is a position held by few philosophers, and not by those 
classical philosophers directly and indirectly referred to here, such as Thales, 
Leucippus, Democritus and Empedocles, not to mention Plato and Aristotle. 
Hegel clearly recognized this,44 and so is hardly likely to have claimed that 
“[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism” if this is what he meant by the 
position. 
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Another reading of the passage sees Hegel as offering a picture of 
idealism here not as mentalistic, but as holistic.45 On this account, Hegel claims 
that finite entities do not have “veritable, ultimate, absolute being” because they 
are dependent on other entities for their existence in the way that parts are 
dependent on other parts within a whole; and idealism consists in recognizing this 
relatedness between things, in a way that ordinary consciousness fails to do.46 The 
idealist thus sees the world differently from the realist, not as a plurality of 
separate entities that are “self-subsistent or grounded in themselves”, but as parts 
of an interconnected totality in which these entities are dependent on their place 
within the whole. It turns out, then, that idealism for Hegel is primarily an 
ontological position, which holds that the things of ordinary experience are ideal 
in the sense that they have no being in their own right, and so lack the self-
sufficiency and self-subsistence required to be fully real. 
Now, this is an account of Hegel’s idealism that Ameriks also considers, 
but dismisses on the grounds of extravagance. For, if Hegel is taken to be 
suggesting that finite existences lack “veritable, ultimate, absolute being”, it may 
seem he is basing this on the claim to have found a candidate for absolute status 
elsewhere – in the “world-whole”, which as “a self-standing, self-realizing 
structure” constitutes a limit to explanation in the way no finite entity can, 
because as a totality “there is nothing else it could depend on”.47 But if it involves 
theorizing about the world-whole in this way, it may appear that Hegel’s idealism 
is guilty of just the kind of pre-Kantian metaphysical irresponsibility that Pippin 
and others have sought to escape.48 As contemporary philosophers, it could be 
argued, we should treat this project with caution.49 
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It is not clear, however, that this account of Hegel’s idealism should be 
dismissed on these grounds, because not all forms of holism of this kind need be 
seen as extravagant, at least from a Kantian perspective. For, while such a theory 
will require the abandonment of a purely naturalistic explanatory framework, 
which is suspicious of explanations which have global scope and have a reflexive 
or “free-standing” structure, this abandonment is arguably already a feature of 
Kant’s transcendental turn, where the aim is (as David Bell has put it), to provide 
a “genuinely self-subsistent, self-warranting framework of explanation”.50 Where 
the theory would become objectionable in Kantian terms, would be if it led to a 
transcendent claim, and so to a form of explanation based on appeal to some 
metaphysical ground outside or beyond the empirical world – for example, a self-
positing infinite Absolute that gives rise to finite existents as their creator. But it 
seems clear that a proponent of Hegel as an holistic, absolute-theorist could 
plausibly claim that Hegel’s aim was to avoid any transcendence of this kind,51 
while nonetheless holding that the world-whole constitutes a satisfactory limit to 
explanation; so proponents of this reading will characteristically argue that 
Hegel’s position was designed to show that the world is a kind of totality that 
makes notions of “cause” and “ground” inapplicable at this level, rather than to 
bring the regress of explanation to an end by positing a transcendent starting-
point.52 Thus, the holistic strategy is arguably to claim that the pressure towards 
transcendence only arises because we are operating with an incomplete picture of 
the world which drives us into a regress of explanations which this transcendent 
first cause is then designed to block; but once we see the world as a totality in 
itself, no such transcendent answer to the question of explanation will be needed. 
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The aim of this approach, then, is “to articulate an alternative vision of reality – 
and not a vision of some alternative reality”,53 so that far from being a form of 
pre-Kantian metaphysics that tries to claim access to some extramundane 
absolute, Hegel’s idealism is a form of absolute-theory that can be treated as in 
line with the transcendental turn, of giving us a conception of the world that will 
show how the need for explanation can be satisfied without going beyond it. 
However, even if it is right to say that holism can be thought of as an 
option that follows not just from metaphysical extravagance on Hegel’s part, but 
from a concern with the limits of naturalistic explanation that was also shared by 
Kant, the suspicion may nonetheless be raised that Hegel goes further here than 
Kant would allow, in that Kant did not want his “alternative vision of reality” to 
undercut our ordinary, “empirical”, conception of the world,54 while Hegel’s form 
of holism by contrast threatens to undermine it completely. For, it is often held 
that Hegel’s holism is Spinozistic, and based around the principle that “omnis 
determinatio est negatio” [“all determination is negation”],55 understood as the 
idea that everything depends on its difference from other things to be itself. If this 
is so, it may appear that the status of individuals within this holism is lost: for a 
consequence seems to be that nothing has any intrinsic properties as each is what 
it is through its relation to others, so there are only relational properties, and in 
such a purely relational system, how can the relata cannot be said to be entities in 
their own right, even to the extent of being parts – so that in the end, the whole 
becomes the One.56 By posing a threat to the status of individuals in this way, 
Hegel’s holism may appear to be revisionary in a way that Kant claimed his 
idealism was not (as well as having troubling ethical consequences, of the sort 
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also sometimes attributed to him, concerning the low moral value of individuality 
within Hegel’s system). 
Now, there are possible replies that might be given to this kind of concern 
from the perspective of a holistic reading of Hegel, such as questioning whether 
this can indeed be derived from the idea of determination through negation, or the 
assumption that even if this means there are relations “all the way down”, this 
leaves no room for individuals. However, another response is to question the 
holistic reading as an accurate account of Hegel’s position. For, in fact, this 
reading suffers from a textual difficulty, which can be explained as follows. The 
passage we are discussing comes as part of a “Remark” appended to the second 
chapter of Book I of the Science of Logic, where this chapter is divided into an 
account of “Determinate Being (Dasein) as such”, “Finitude” and “Infinity”, so 
that the passage forms part of a sequel to Hegel’s discussion of the relation 
between the finite and the infinite. This is important, because it strongly suggests 
that when Hegel writes that finite things lack “veritable being” and so are ideal 
because not “self-sufficient or grounded in themselves”, he does not mean that 
they are related to other finite things (as on the holistic reading), but rather that 
they are related to the infinite, which is the conclusion he has been trying to 
establish in the part of the chapter to which this Remark is appended. Immediately 
before the Remark, Hegel makes this clear by saying: “ideal being [das Ideelle] is 
the finite as it is in the true infinite – as a determination, a content, which is 
distinct but is not an independent, self-subsistent being, but only a moment”.57 
That this context is important to understanding Hegel’s conception of 
idealism is equally clear in the equivalent discussion in the Encyclopaedia Logic, 
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where again Hegel’s striking claim that “every genuine philosophy is idealism” is 
made in the course of his discussion of the connection between the finite and the 
infinite. Here he argues that while “finitude…is under the determination of reality 
at first” because finite things are seen to have the reality of “being-there” or 
Dasein, it now becomes clear that they are not merely self-related but contain 
their “other”, where this other is the infinite, which is likewise essentially related 
to the finite in a relation Hegel calls “being-for-itself” (Fürsichsein), whereby the 
one is “sublated” [aufgehoben] in the other: 
In being-for-itself the determination of ideality has entered. Being-there, taken at first 
only according to its being or its affirmation, has reality (§91); and hence finitude, too, is 
under the determination of reality at first. But the truth of the finite is rather its ideality… 
This ideality of the finite is the most important proposition of philosophy, and for that 
reason every genuine philosophy is Idealism. Everything depends on not mistaking for 
the Infinite that which is at once reduced in its determination to what is particular and 
finite.58 
The details of Hegel’s position and terminology here are difficult, but the basic 
idea is fairly straightforward: the infinite cannot be “beyond” the finite as 
something external to it, as this would be to limit the infinite and thus make it 
finite; the infinite must therefore be incorporated within the finite in some way, so 
that the finite is not to be viewed as simply “being-there”, but as related to its 
“other” while preserving its difference from its other and remaining finite, so that 
the distinction between the one side and the other is “sublated”, in Hegel’s sense 
of being both “cancelled” and “preserved”.59 It would appear from this, then, that 
what Hegel means by claiming that the finite is ideal, is not that finite things 
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depend on one another as parts of a whole (as on the holistic reading), but that 
these things stand in a complex dialectical relation to the infinite. 
Now, at first sight, none of this may appear to help us much with the 
worry that Hegel’s idealism poses a threat to the status of individuals and so does 
not “leave the world alone” in a properly Kantian manner; for it may now seem 
that we are obliged to move from holism to monism as an account of Hegel’s 
system, and while the former can at least in principle allow for the status of 
individuals (even if in Hegel’s hands it seems it might not), monism cannot do so 
even in principle. For, while holism stresses the dependence of finite things on 
one another, in its modest form it can still respect the individuality of finite things 
in so far as parts can be individuals, to the extent of having identity conditions 
that make it intelligible to treat a part as the same, and so as persisting over time; 
but monism denies the individuality of finite things in these respects, treating 
them as “accidents” or “modifications” or “appearances” of a unified substance or 
ground or underlying reality that takes on these forms, in the way that a single 
piece of paper may have many wrinkles, or a face may have many expressions, 
where the paper or the face constitute individuals of which the wrinkles and the 
expressions are modifications, lacking in any of the continuity or identity 
conditions that make them individuals (e.g. it doesn’t make sense to ask “is the 
smile you have got today the same as the one you had yesterday?”, whereas it 
does make sense to ask of a limb that has been sown back onto a body “is that the 
arm you had before, or someone else’s?”).60 While of course monism has had its 
philosophical defenders, it is clearly more revisionary of our common-sense 
ontology than a modest holism, and so would make Hegel’s idealism problematic 
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in the same was as it was on the earlier holistic reading, if this is what it has 
turned out to involve. 
The question is, then, if we take Hegel’s idealism to amount to the claim 
that the finite and infinite are dialectically related, does this commit us to giving a 
monistic reading of this position? In fact, I do not believe this is so, for this would 
be to overlook the complexity of Hegel’s thinking here. As Hegel’s discussion 
later in the Logic shows, he holds that categories like substance and accident or 
ground and existence can be misleading in the kind of metaphysical picture they 
give rise to: but this is what happens on the monistic reading, where the infinite is 
treated as if it itself must be a self-standing individual or substance, and because it 
cannot be one individual amongst others, this means that the individuality of 
finite existents is thereby lost. Hegel’s preferred model, by contrast, is to think of 
finite existents as embodiments of the infinite, but not in a way that robs them of 
their individuality61 – just as Thales took the principle of everything to be water, 
which is permanent and eternal, but which has its existence in individual things, 
while Democritus thought the same of atoms and Empedocles of the four material 
elements. From Hegel’s perspective, therefore, the picture of the infinite/finite 
relation that might lead to a monistic worry is really based on a simplistic model 
of that relation, and one that he believed we ought not to take up.62 
We can now see why for Hegel, a position like Thales’ is idealistic in his 
sense, with his doctrine that “the principle of all is water”. On the one hand (at 
least following Aristotle’s account), Thales treated the world as containing 
ordinary finite objects, while on the other hand, he recognized in these objects an 
eternal and imperishable material substance – water – which constitutes these 
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objects through a process of change, as it takes on new forms. Objects are thus 
transient and perishable, but in this transience water remains as permanent and 
unchanging, so that the finite contains the infinite within it. At the same time, 
water is required to take on these changing manifestations as part of its nature: it 
has no being simply as water, so that in this sense the infinite also requires the 
finite. Similarly, atoms or matter are the infinite contained within the finite, as is a 
law within its instances, or a universal within its instantiations. All such positions 
are idealistic in Hegel’s sense; and once we see this, we can also see that Hegel’s 
idealism is neither straightforwardly a form of monism or holism, though it is 
related to both. His idealism is not monistic in the sense we have discussed, 
because the finite entities retain their status as individuals, and are not mere 
attributes of a single substance. And his idealism is not holistic, because the fact 
that a finite thing is constituted by something “ultimate and absolute”, like water 
or atoms, does not make it a part of a whole with other such things, any more than 
two houses that are both made from bricks are so related. However, while this 
shows that idealism for Hegel does not entail holism, it is no accident that Hegel 
will talk of the parts of a whole as “ideal”:63 for Hegel believed that a proper part 
must be seen as a limited reflection of the totality to which it belongs, where this 
relation makes the whole “infinite” in relation to the parts as “finite”. Thus, for 
example, Hegel describes the state as “infinite within itself” because it can be 
viewed holistically in this way: “this divided whole exhibits a fixed and enduring 
determinacy which is not dead and unchanging but continues to produce itself in 
its dissolution”.64 We can therefore see that while idealism in Hegel’s sense may 
not entail holism (cf. Thales and the ancient atomists), nonetheless holism may 
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entail idealism for Hegel, in that to be a part is to be a limited aspect of a totality, 
as when the parts of a body manifest the life of the whole, or the state as a unity is 
manifested in its different constitutional elements, much in the way matter is 
realized through different finite individuals. 
Of course, a metaphysical position of this kind is not without its 
difficulties; and Hegel does not attempt to work them through here, at the stage of 
the Logic which we have been discussing: rather, he goes on to do so in the third 
book of the Logic, in his “Doctrine of the Concept”. There, we are introduced to 
the dialectically interrelated structure of universality, particularity and 
individuality, whereby each category is seen to imply the others, so that the 
Concept as such forms a self-contained system that abolishes the problem of an 
external “ground”: for, an individual is no more than a particularized universal (I 
[individual] am a human being [universal] of such and such a height, weight, and 
so on [particular]); particularization is no more than the individualization of the 
universal (my height, weight etc pertain to me as an individual human being, and 
not as a “bare individual”); and the universal is distinguished from other 
universals by the way it is particularized into individuals (“human being” differs 
from “lion” qua universal, by the way in which it belongs to one group of 
determinate individuals, and not others). This can be seen as Hegel’s own attempt 
to complete the project which he thought began with Thales and which he takes to 
be distinctive of philosophy itself, of finding a way of thinking that will articulate 
the kind of self-reflexive structure needed to understand the relationship between 
the conditioned and the unconditioned, which recognizes the limited nature of the 
former without making the latter transcendent – just as each of the categories of 
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the Concept require the others in order to be explained and understood, without 
any having priority over the others as an “external” ground.65 
IV HEGEL’S IDEALISM AS A CONCEPTUAL 
REALISM 
We have seen, then, that an account of Hegel’s idealism which treats it primarily 
as a metaphysical position – as the claim that finite existents should not be treated 
as “ultimate and absolute” – need not necessarily lead into absurd extravagance 
while it can also avoid triviality and have some claim to textual accuracy. 
However, this account may seem to suffer from a fourth vice, namely, a kind of 
irrelevance, because to be told that this is what Hegel’s idealism amounts to is to 
be presented with a form of idealism that is rather sui generis and hard to connect 
to contemporary debates that surround the idealism/realism issue, which 
essentially concern how the mind relates to things outside the mind, and what 
these things (if any) are. Of course, it would be wrong to criticize Hegel himself 
on this score alone; but it would nonetheless suggest that there is less to be gained 
from considering Hegel’s idealism than we might at first have hoped. Hegel may 
seem merely to be claiming the following: Finite things are not themselves 
infinite, but are limited forms in which the infinite is realized; they therefore lack 
“veritable being”, because they are not in themselves “ultimate and absolute 
or…underived, uncreated, eternal”; they are therefore ideal, while “it is not the 
finite which is real but the infinite”.66 Even if we grant Hegel this conclusion, it is 
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hard to see how this would establish “idealism” in a way that relates to current 
concerns. 
However, though I think we should take the way Hegel characterizes 
“idealism” seriously, and take note of the ontological use he gives it, it is also 
clear that Hegel takes his position here to have wider implications, which may 
make what he says of greater contemporary relevance and interest. To see what 
these implications might be, we should focus on Hegel’s claim that “[e]very 
philosophy is essentially an idealism”, where here Hegel is suggesting that any 
properly philosophical position must endorse idealism as he conceives it. His 
implied contrast here, I think, is not just with “common sense” or “ordinary 
consciousness”, which recognizes that objects are “not self-subsistent or grounded 
in themselves”, but cannot reconcile this with its stronger sense that objects are 
individuals and thus (it supposes) “self-standing and self-founded”, and so this 
form of consciousness cannot grasp the complex philosophical outlook Hegel is 
proposing which is supposed to accommodate both insights;67 an additional 
contrast, I believe, is also with nonphilosophy, which for Hegel is a position 
associated with the empiricist tradition as it existed in Germany, particularly in 
the work of F. H. Jacobi.68 For Hegel, Jacobi counts as a follower of “those 
radical arch-empiricists, Hume and Locke” because like them, he has “posited the 
particular as such as the Absolute”,69 rather than seeing that finite particulars lack 
“veritable being” in Hegel”s sense, that is, that they are “not self-subsistent or 
grounded in themselves”; Jacobi has thus ended up with a position in which “the 
finite is posited as absolute”,70 and so with a position that counts as an example of 
realism, in Hegel’s use of this term. Thus, while Hegel believes that as far as 
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philosophy is concerned, “the opposition of idealistic and realistic philosophy has 
no significance”, he does not expect it to have no significance for ordinary 
consciousness or (more importantly) nonphilosophy of the sort propounded 
(Hegel thinks) by Jacobi. In tracing out this issue further, we will see that Hegel’s 
idealism is relevant to contemporary issues after all, because of the wider 
questions this raises. 
What this dispute with Jacobi brings out, is that for Hegel his idealism 
requires a repudiation of empiricism, and thus a richer conception of the relation 
between thought and world. Idealism for Hegel, as we have seen, is a position that 
does not treat finite things as “ultimate and absolute” in themselves but relates 
them to an enduring and infinite “ground” of some kind, of which these finite 
things are limited realizations; but what idealism in this sense requires, Hegel 
thinks, is that we move beyond “empirical cognition”. This is because this infinite 
ground is not something that is apparent to us in experience, but can only be 
something we arrive at through reflection.71 The idealist must therefore be 
prepared to treat this nonobservable form of being as real in the way that the 
empiricist refuses to do, because the empiricist cannot allow such “ideal entities” 
into his ontology. Now, Hegel takes it to be characteristic of the philosopher that 
he is prepared to take this step and to take such “ideal entities” to be real, because 
he is prepared to trust in those capacities of thought that go beyond the direct 
evidence of our senses through a process of theorizing and intellectual reflection 
that arrives at a deeper level of explanation and understanding. This is why, then, 
Hegel believes he can claim that “[e]very philosophy is essentially an idealism” in 
his sense: for in his view the philosopher is characteristically driven to seek more 
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satisfactory forms of explanation than can be given at the level of the observable 
phenomena, while being a realist about the entities such explanations require, 
whether these are Thales’ water, Democritus’ atoms, or the laws and genera of 
natural science, in which “things as they immediately present themselves to us” 
have a more stable grounding: 
Nature offers us an infinite mass of singular shapes and appearances. We feel the need to 
bring unity into this manifold; therefore, we compare them and seek to [re]cognise what 
is universal in each of them. Individuals are born and pass away; in them their kind is 
what abides, what recurs in all of them; and it is only present for us when we think about 
them. This is where laws, e.g., the laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies, belong too. 
We see the stars in one place today and in another tomorrow; this disorder is for the spirit 
something incongruous, and not to be trusted, since the spirit believes in an order, a 
simple, constant, and universal determination [of things]. This is the faith in which the 
spirit has directed its [reflective] thinking upon phenomena, and has come to know their 
laws, establishing the motion of the heavenly bodies in a universal manner, so that every 
change of position can be determined and [re]cognised on the basis of this law… From 
all these examples we may gather how, in thinking about things, we always seek what is 
fixed, persisting, and inwardly determined, and what governs the particular. This 
universal cannot be grasped by means of the senses, and it counts as what is essential and 
true.72 
This, then, explains Hegel’s incongruous-looking claim in the main passage we 
have been considering, that “the principles of ancient or modern philosophies, 
water, or matter, or atoms are thoughts, universals, ideal entities”, when this may 
seem hard to square with the sort of materialism that Hegel is here referring to. 
The explanation for this claim, we can now see, is that even a materialist like 
Thales as well as a more modern materialist must agree that their conception of 
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matter is not matter as it is given to us in experience (not just empirical water), 
and thus that “there is no truth in the sensible as such”,73 because “matter is itself 
already something abstract, something which cannot be perceived as such”.74 It is 
for this reason that Hegel believes that “[w]ith Thales we, properly speaking, first 
begin the history of Philosophy”,75 because Thales starts the process of looking 
for an explanation for the nature of finite existents while at the same time seeing 
that this explanation must go further than our “sensuous perception” in whatever 
“first principle” it comes up with, as nothing revealed to us by the senses can be 
“ultimate and absolute” in a way that is required to make this explanation 
satisfactory: “The simple proposition of Thales [that the principle of all things is 
water] therefore, is Philosophy, because in it water, though sensuous, is not 
looked at in its particularity as opposed to other natural things, but as Thought in 
which everything is resolved and comprehended”.76 Thales is therefore 
responsible for allowing “the world of Thought [die Gedankenwelt]” to be found, 
without which “there is as yet no pure unity”.77 
Now, while Hegel takes it to be characteristic of a classical philosopher 
like Thales to accept that his nonempirical conception of water is valid on purely 
theoretical grounds (because it provides a unifying form of explanation), he 
recognizes that in modern philosophy “the presupposition of the older 
metaphysics, namely, that what is true in things lies in thought”78 has been 
radically questioned; in its place has come a kind of empiricist positivism, which 
trusts only experience to tell us about the world, and so treats as real only what is 
observable: 
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Ancient metaphysics had in this respect a higher conception of thinking than is current 
today. For it based itself on the fact that the knowledge of things obtained through 
thinking is alone what is really true in them, that is, things not in their immediacy but as 
first raised into the form of thought, as things thought. Thus this metaphysics believed 
that thinking (and its determinations) is not anything alien to the object, but rather is its 
essential nature, or that things and the thinking of them – our language too expresses 
their kinship – are explicitly in full agreement, thinking in its immanent determinations 
and the true nature of things forming one and the same content. 
But reflective understanding took possession of philosophy…. Directed against 
reason, it behaves as ordinary common sense and imposes its view that truth rests on 
sensuous reality, that thoughts are only thoughts, meaning that it is sense perception 
which first gives them filling and reality and that reason left to its own resources 
engenders only figments of the brain. In this self-renunciation on the part of reason, the 
Notion of truth is lost; it is limited to knowing only subjective truth, phenomena, 
appearances, only something to which the nature of the object itself does not correspond: 
knowing has lapsed into opinion.79 
In his work, Hegel treats Jacobi as a typical product of this modern turn, and uses 
him to illustrate its consequences. The basis on which Jacobi takes this turn is a 
hostility to any search for explanation of the sort that philosophy goes in for, 
which he fears leads into empty abstractions: as Jacobi famously puts it, “In my 
judgment the greatest service of the scientist is to unveil existence, and to reveal 
it…. Obsession with explanation makes us seek what is common to all things so 
passionately that we pay no attention to diversity in the process; we only want 
always to join together, whereas it would often be much more to our advantage to 
separate…. Moreover, in joining and hanging together only what is explainable in 
things, there also arises in the soul a certain lustre that blinds us more than it 
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illuminates”.80 As a result of this fear of abstractionism, Hegel argues, Jacobi no 
longer treats our intellectual capacities as a source of knowledge, and instead 
prioritizes the “faculty of perception” over the “faculty of reflection”.81 The 
consequence of this position, Hegel claims, is that Jacobi cannot do anything 
other than treat finite entities as “self-subsistent and grounded in themselves”, 
because to offer any deeper explanation of them would require violating the 
“immediacy” of perception and going beyond “sensuous reality”. Hegel therefore 
writes: “In this declaration…Jacobi explicitly restricts faith and eternal verities to 
what is temporal and corporeal”.82 We can see, then, how Hegel might reasonably 
associate philosophy as he conceives it with idealism in his sense, and why he 
might think of Jacobi as illustrating the link between the abandonment of this 
idealism and the turn to nonphilosophy.83 
Now, as a matter of interpretation, it might be said that Hegel’s view of 
Jacobi here is rather curious: for, if one considers the theological side of Jacobi’s 
position, Jacobi was no straightforward empiricist, as he recognized a higher 
faculty that gives us access to God as a supernatural entity – a faculty which 
Jacobi came to call “reason”.84 His claim was that to get to an awareness of God, 
we could not use the understanding, which merely “hovers above the intuitions of 
the senses”85 by looking for causal explanations in a way that cannot lead us to 
the unconditioned but only to an infinite regress: so while reason is akin to the 
senses in being immediate, it gives us access to a very different kind of being, one 
that is infinite rather than finite; and, in view of this, how can Hegel’s 
characterisation of Jacobi as positing “the finite…as absolute” be considered 
appropriate? 
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It could be replied, however, that if there is a difficulty here, it is Jacobi’s 
and not Hegel’s. For, of course, Hegel was fully aware of this theological side to 
Jacobi’s thinking, and was critical of it in its turn, in ways that need not concern 
us here. But the fact that this side of Jacobi’s position is in tension with his 
attempt to give experience of ordinary objects priority over the “abstractions” of 
philosophy (for doesn’t Jacobi’s “reason” also threaten the store we set by that 
experience?)86 does not show that Hegel is wrong to identify elements of 
empiricist “commonsensism” in Jacobi’s thinking, even if these may seem to 
conflict with aspects of his theological position.87 
We can now also understand the way in which Hegel compares his 
idealism to Kant’s. On the one hand, Kant is an idealist in Hegel’s sense, because 
he treats “things…in their sensuous individuality” as less than the full story about 
reality, and so goes beyond empiricism, which takes these things to be all that is 
real: “Critical Philosophy has in common with Empiricism that it accepts 
experience as the only basis for our cognitions; but it will not let them count as 
truths, but only as cognitions of appearances”.88 While this goes against “ordinary 
consciousness”, which holds that what exists “can be perceived by the senses 
(e.g., this animal, this star)” because “this appears to it as what subsists on its own 
account, or as what is independent”, Hegel endorses Kant’s position here, 
agreeing with what he takes to be the Kantian point, that “what can be perceived 
by the senses is really secondary and not self-standing”. Now, against this view 
held by “ordinary consciousness”, as we have seen, Hegel wants to argue that 
reality does not fully reveal itself to us in perception, but also requires us to use 
thought, which is able to arrive at a grasp of the “ideal entities” which constitute 
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the “enduring and inwardly stable” basis of reality. According to Hegel, Kant was 
unable to take this second step of granting objective truth to such “ideal entities”, 
because he held that “thoughts, although they are universal and necessary 
determinations, are still only our thoughts, and are cut off from what the thing is 
in-itself by an impassable gulf”. Thus, while Kant recognized that thought was 
required in order to grasp the world as more than the “fleeting and transient” 
objects of experience, he did not accept that this thought gave us access to the 
world as such; he therefore did not recognize “the true objectivity of thinking…: 
that thoughts are not merely our thoughts, but at the same time the In-itself of 
things and of whatever else is objective”.89 To Hegel, therefore, Kant remains a 
merely subjective idealist, in contrast to his own objective idealism, because Kant 
is not prepared to treat “what is universal and necessary” as really anything more 
than “what is only thought by us”, and so not as ultimately real. 
If this is the view that Hegel’s idealism leads to, however, isn’t it still 
guilty of precritical extravagance, when set against the kind of epistemological 
and metaphysical outlook (of which Kant is part) which abandons “the 
presupposition of the older metaphysics, namely, that what is true in things lies in 
thought”,90 and so tries to go no further than the empirical phenomena?91 In fact, 
however, Hegel would claim that in finding something in the classical tradition 
that still needs to be taken seriously, he was building on the real lesson to be 
learned from Kant (even if it was not learned by Kant himself). This is that there 
can be no workable distinction between “immediate” experience and “mediated” 
thought, as conceptualisation runs through all cognitively relevant levels, making 
it impossible for the empiricist to question our faith in thinking without ending up 
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in total scepticism:92 for to claim that we should not trust our conceptual 
capacities when it comes to theorizing about the world is to imply that we should 
not trust our experience of it either, as Kant showed that these capacities are 
involved in the latter as much as in the former.93 This interpretation, then, draws 
on the same line of argument as Pippin’s Kantian one, which also recognizes (as 
we have seen) that “it is with the denial that a firm distinction can ever be usefully 
drawn between intuitional and conceptual elements in knowledge that 
distinctively Hegelian idealism begins”; but it takes this argument in a different 
direction, that attempts to do greater justice to the other important influence on 
Hegel, which is the classical tradition. Insofar as Kant himself points beyond 
empiricism, therefore, Hegel can claim not to have made a merely regressive 
move.94 
Ameriks himself offers two objections to the kind of account of Hegel’s 
idealism that I have offered. The first is that the implied difference from Kant is 
misleading,95 a point that we cannot consider in the detail it requires here; and the 
second it that “[this] notion of idealism does not mark a contrast with traditional 
realism”,96 for while it holds that “what is true in things lies in thought”, this does 
not mean that things are mind-dependent, but that they are fundamentally 
constituted in a way that is accessible to thought rather than sense, by “universals, 
ideal entities, not things as they immediately present themselves to us”. I do not 
see this second point as a difficulty, however: for why should any contrast be 
expected or required? To think that there must be a contrast between idealism and 
realism is to see idealism as having only its modern sense, according to which the 
former treats things as mind-dependent and the latter as mind-independent. But 
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once it is recognized that idealism can also be understood in a more classical 
manner, where the disagreement is whether the world contains “ideal entities” 
(and thus with positivism and nominalism) and not whether the subject constitutes 
the world (and thus not with realism), we can see how Hegel could have quite 
properly called himself an idealist whilst remaining a realist, so no contrast need 
to be drawn here to make sense of his position in the way we have done.97 
We have thus found two (related) senses in which Hegel is an idealist, and 
one in which he is a realist, and shown how these positions are compatible: he is 
an idealist in his special sense, of holding that the “finite is ideal”, and (therefore) 
an idealist in the more classical (antinominalist) sense of holding that taken as 
mere finite individuals, things in the world cannot provide a satisfactory terminus 
for explanation, but only when they are seen to exemplify “universals, ideal 
entities” (in the manner of Thales’ water onwards) which are not given in 
immediate experience, but only in “[reflective] thinking upon phenomena”. 
Hegel’s idealism, in other words, amounts to a form of conceptual realism, 
understood as ‘the belief that concepts are part of the structure of reality’.98 
However, none of this implies that Hegel is an idealist in the modern 
(subjectivist) sense of claiming that the world is mind-dependent, for individuals 
can be understood as instantiations of such “universals, ideal entities”, which then 
in turn explains how such individuals are accessible to minds, without the need 
for this subjectivist turn.99 And I have also tried to suggest that this can be 
presented as more than just a reversion to a precritical outlook, in so far as the 
Kantian objection to the cogency of empiricism plays a vital role at a crucial 
point, albeit it in a way that Kant did not envisage and would no doubt have tried 
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to resist – so this is a case of “reculer pour mieux sauter”, where the intention is 
not just to go back, but to go back in order also to get further, and go “beyond 
Kant” as well. In the end, therefore, we have arguably reached an account of 
Hegel’s idealism that meets Ameriks’ original desiderata, of being textually 
accurate, philosophically interesting, and not dubiously extravagant.100 
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necessarily goes on to relate the sensuous to the universal which is not observable 
in an immediate manner, to cognize each thing as in itself a connectedness: in 
force, for example, to comprehend all its manifestations; and to seek out the 
connections and mediations that exist between separate individual things. While 
therefore the merely sensuous consciousness merely shows things, that is to say, 
exhibits them in their immediacy, perception, on the other hand, apprehends the 
connectedness of things, demonstrates that when such and such circumstances are 
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present such and such a thing follows, and thus begins to demonstrate the truth of 
things”. 
47 Willem A. deVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 13, 15. [Au: page order change ok? With the 
change, the page numbers do not reflect the order of the quotations in the main 
text – so keep my previous order?] 
48 Cf. Ameriks, “Hegel and Idealism”, p. 397. 
49 Cf. deVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Acitivity, p. 13: ‘We have to be 
extremely suspicious of Hegel’s rather dogmatic belief that the world-whole does 
form a unitary totality’. 
50 David Bell, “Transcendental Arguments and Non-Naturalistic Anti-Realism”, 
in Robert Stern, ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 189–210, at p. 199; see also David 
Bell, “Is Empirical Realism Compatible With Transcendental Idealism?”, in 
Ralph Schumacher, ed., Idealismus als Theorie der Repräsentation? (Paderborn: 
Mentis, 2001), pp. 167–180. 
51 Cf. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 94 addition, p. 150 (Werke, VIII, p. 
200): “Philosophy does not waste time with such empty and otherworldly stuff. 
What philosophy has to do with is always something concrete and strictly 
present”. 
52 Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: Part Two of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. by Michael John Petry, 3 
vols.  (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), section 247 addition, I, p. 208 
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(Werke, IX, pp. 26–27), translation modified: “To our ordinary thinking 
[Vorstellung], the world is merely a collection of finitudes [Endlichkeiten], but if 
grasped as universal, as a totality, the question of a beginning at once disappears”. 
For further discussion of this “negative” strategy, which (I claim) can also be 
found in the work of some of the British Idealists who commented on Hegel, see 
Robert Stern, “British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?”, European 
Journal of Philosophy, 2 (1994), pp. 293–321. 
53 Bell, “Is Empirical Realism Compatible With Transcendental Idealism?”, p. 
177.  
54 Cf. ibid, p. 177: “If the goal of a transcendental theory is to articulate an 
alternative vision of reality – and not a vision of some alternative reality – then 
clearly it is a condition of success that there must be some sense in which the 
notion of reality remains constant throughout. There must, that is, be a sense in 
which “philosophy leaves everything as it is,” in which it “leaves the world 
alone” and refrains, say, from contesting the findings of natural science as if those 
findings were simply false”. 
55 Cf. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, section 91 addition, p. 147 (Werke, VIII, pp. 
196–197). As was his wont, Hegel was slightly misquoting Spinoza here; in his 
Letter 50 (to Jarig Jelles, 2 June 1674), Spinoza writes “determinatio negatio est”. 
See On The Improvement of the Understanding, The Ethics, Correspondence, 
[this translation contains all three of these works – so should all be italicised?] 
trans by R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), p. 370: “This 
determination [i.e. figure] therefore does not appertain to the thing according to 
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its being, but, on the contrary, is its nonbeing. As then figure is nothing else than 
determination, and determination is negation, figure, as has been said, can be 
nothing but negation”. Whether Hegel is right to interpret Spinoza’s remarks in 
the way he does can be questioned: see Pierre Macherey, Hegel ou Spinoza, 2nd 
edn. (Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 1990), ch. 4. 
56 This concern was raised by Jacobi, in his critical discussion of Spinoza that 
(inadvertently) did so much to introduce Spinoza into the thinking of the period. 
See F. H. Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
Mendelssohn, in The Main Philosophical Writings, trans. by George di Giovanni 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), p. 220, where 
Jacobi glosses Spinoza’s remark in Letter 50 as follows: “Individual things, 
therefore, so far as they only exist in a certain determinate mode, are non-entia 
[non-entities]; the indeterminate infinite being is the one single true ens reale, hoc 
est, est omne esse, & praeter quod nullum datur esse [real being; it is the all of 
being, and apart from it there is no being]”. The quotation in the last part of 
Jacobi’s remark comes from Spinoza’s On The Improvement of the 
Understanding, p. 29. 
57 Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 149–150 (Werke, V, p. 165). Cf. also ibid., pp. 
151-152 (Werke, V, p. 168): “The resolution of this contradiction [that finite and 
infinite are both the same and different] is not the recognition of the equal 
correctness and equal uncorrectness of the two assertions – this is only another 
form of the abiding contradiction – but the ideality of both, in which as distinct, 
reciprocal negations, they are only moments… In this being which is thus the 
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ideality of the distinct moments [of finite and infinite], the contradiction has not 
vanished abstractly, but is resolved and reconciled, and the thoughts are not only 
complete, but they are also brought together”.  
58 Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 95, p. 152 (Werke, VIII, pp. 202–203). 
59 Cf. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, section 96 addition, p. 154 (Werke, VIII, pp. 
204–205) and Science of Logic, pp. 106–107 (Werke, V, pp. 113–114).  
60 This way of characterising monism is to treat it as an answer to the question of 
how many individuals there are (sometimes called “substance monism”), rather 
than as an answer to the question of how many types or varieties of things there 
are (sometimes called “kind monism”). 
61 Thus, while commenting that “to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential 
commencement of all Philosophy” (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
III, p. 257 (Werke, XX, p. 165)), Hegel makes it very clear that he could not 
accept the monism he found in Spinoza: “As all differences and determinations of 
things and of consciousness simply go back into the One substance, one may say 
that in the system of Spinoza all things are merely cast down into this abyss of 
annihilation. But from this abyss nothing comes out” (ibid., p. 288 (Werke, XX, p. 
166)). 
62 Another route from holism to monism, adopted after Hegel by F. H. Bradley, is 
to argue from the unreality of relations to the nonexistence of any kind of 
plurality of individual things, even as parts within a whole: but there is no reason 
to think that Hegel would have endorsed this argument either. For further 
discussion, see Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Ontologie und Relationen: Hegel, Bradley, 
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Russell und die Kontroverse über interne und externe Beziehungen (Königstein: 
Athenäum, 1984). 
63 See, for example, G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 
trans. by T. M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), I, p. 120 
(Werke, XIII, pp. 162–163): “The process of life comprises a double activity: on 
the one hand, that of bringing steadily into existence perceptibly the real 
differences of all the members and specific characteristics of the organism, but, 
on the other hand, that of asserting in them their universal ideality (which is their 
animation) if they try to persist in independent severance from one another and 
isolate themselves in fixed differences from one another. This is the idealism of 
life. For philosophy is not at all the only example of idealism; nature, as life, 
already makes a matter of fact what idealist philosophy brings to completion in its 
own spiritual field”; and Hegel, Philosophy of Right, section 276 addition, p. 314 
(Werke, VII, pp. 441–442): “This ideality of the moments [in the state] is like life 
in an organic body: it is present at every point, there is only one life in all of them, 
and there is no resistance to it. Separated from it, each point must die. The same 
applies to the ideality of all the individual estates, powers, and corporations, 
however much their impulse may be to subsist and have being for themselves. In 
this respect, they resemble the stomach of an organism which also posits itself as 
independent [für sich] but is at the same time superseded and sacrificed and 
passes over into the whole”. 
64 Hegel, Philosophy of Right,  section 270 addition, pp. 302–303 (Werke, VII, p. 
429). 
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65 It is of course profoundly difficult to assess whether this distinctive Hegelian 
conception of the Absolute is ultimately cogent, as it forms the basis for the 
critique of Hegel from late Schelling onwards: it is impossible to consider this 
debate in any further detail here, but in different ways the work of Dieter Henrich, 
Michael Theunissen, Manfred Frank, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Vittorio Hösle 
would all be relevant. Among authors working in English, the contributions of J. 
N. Findlay, Stanley Rosen, and Andrew Bowie also bear on this issue. 
66 Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 149 (Werke, V, p. 164). 
67 Cf. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 45 addition, p. 88 (Werke, VIII, p. 
122). Hegel of course believed that this kind of difficulty is characteristic of 
“ordinary consciousness”, which oscillates between ‘one-sided’ views that it is 
unable to reconcile. 
68 Jacobi himself characterised his own position as a “nonphilosophy”: see Jacobi, 
Jacobi to Fichte, in the Main Philosophical Writings, p. 501, p. 505, p. 519. Cf. 
Hegel’s remark that ‘the only philosophy acknowledged [by Jacobi and his 
followers] is not a philosophy at all!’ (Hegel, Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, III, p. 477 (Werke, XX, p. 384)).  
69 G. W. F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), p. 137 (Werke, II, pp. 376–377). 
70 Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 74, pp. 120–121 (Werke, VIII, p. 163): 
“The form of immediacy gives to the particular the determination of being, or of 
relating itself to itself. But the particular is precisely the relating of itself to 
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another outside it; [but] through that form [of immediacy] the finite is posited as 
absolute”. 
71 Cf. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, III, p. 445 (Werke, XX, pp. 
352–353): “It is certainly correct to say that the infinite is not given in the world 
of sensuous perception; and supposing that what we know is experience, a 
synthesis of what is thought and what is felt, the infinite certainly cannot be 
known in the sense that we have a sensuous perception if it. But no one wishes to 
demand a sensuous proof in verification of the infinite; spirit is for spirit alone”. 
72 Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 21 addition, p. 53 (Werke, VIII, pp. 77–
78). Cf. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, III, p. 440 (cf. Werke, XX, 
p. 347): “The question of whether a completed sensuousness or the Notion is the 
higher may…be easily decided. For the laws of the heavens are not immediately 
perceived, but merely the change in position on the part of the stars. It is only 
when this object of immediate perception is laid hold of and brought under 
universal thought determinations that experience arises therefrom, which has a 
claim to validity for all time. The category which brings the unity of thought into 
the content of feeling is thus the objective element in experience, which receives 
thereby universality and necessity, while that which is perceived is rather the 
subjective and contingent”. 
73 Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, section 76, p. 122 (Werke, VIII, p. 166). 
74 Ibid.,  section 38, p. 79 (Werke, VIII, p. 111).  
75 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, I, p. 171 (Werke, XVIII, p. 195). 
76 Ibid., p. 179 (Werke, XVIII, p. 202). 
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77 Ibid., p. 178 (Werke, XVIII, p. 203). Adorno may have had this passage from 
Hegel in mind when he wrote: “[I]n the thought of such early so-called anit-
metaphysicians and materialists as Leucippus and Democritus, the structure of 
the metaphysical, of the absolute and final ground of explanation, is nevertheless 
preserved within their materialistic thought. If one calls these materialists 
metaphysical materialists, because matter for them is the ultimate ground of 
being, one does not entirely miss the mark” (Theodore W. Adorno, Metaphysics: 
Concepts and Problems, edited by Rolf Tiedemann, translated by Edmund 
Jephcott (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 9). 
78 Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, section 38 addition, p. 79 (Werke, VIII, p. 110); 
translation modified. 
79 Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 45–66 (Werke, V, p. 38). Cf. also ibid., p. 160 
(Werke, V, p. 178): “However, to call thought, spirit, God, only an ideal being, 
presupposes the standpoint from which finite being counts as real, and the ideal 
being of being-for-one has only a one-sided meaning”; ibid., p. 590 (Werke VI, p. 
262): “Would one ever have thought that philosophy would deny truth to 
intelligible entities because they lack the spatial and temporal material of the 
sensuous world?”; ibid., p. 707 (Werke, VI, p. 404): “A philosophizing that in its 
view of being does not rise above sense, naturally stops short at merely abstract 
thought, too, in its view of the Notion; such thought stands opposed to being”; 
Encyclopaedia Logic, section 21, p. 52 (Werke, VIII, p. 76): “In §5 we mentioned 
the old belief that what is genuine in objects, [their] constitutions, or what 
happens to them, [i.e.,] what is inner, what is essential, and the matter that counts, 
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is not to be found in consciousness immediately; that it cannot be what the first 
look or impression already offers us, but that we must first think it over in order to 
arrive at the genuine constitution of the object, and that by thinking it over this 
[goal] is indeed achieved”; ibid., section 22 addition, p. 54 (Werke, VIII, p. 79): 
“…it has been the conviction of every age that what is substantial is only reached 
through the reworking of the immediate by our thinking about it. It has most 
notably been only in modern times, on the other hand, that doubts have been 
raised and the distinction between the products of our thinking and what things 
are in themselves has been insisted on… The sickness of our time, which has 
arrived at the point of despair, is the assumption that that our cognition is only 
subjective and that this is the last word about it”; Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, 
section 465 addition, p. 224 (Werke, X, p. 286): “Those who have no conception 
of philosophy become speechless, it is true, when they hear the proposition that 
Thought is Being. None the less, underlying all our actions is the presupposition 
of the unity of Thought and Being. It is as rational, thinking beings that we make 
this presupposition… Pure thinking knows that it alone, and not feeling or 
representation, is capable of grasping the truth in things, and that the assertion of 
Epicurus that the true is what is sensed, must be pronounced a complete 
perversion of the nature of mind”; Hegel, “Aphorisms from the Wastebook”, in 
Jon Stewart, ed., Miscellaneous Writings of G. W. F. Hegel (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2002), p. 246 (Werke, II, p. 542): “The peasant 
woman lives within the circle of her Lisa, who is her best cow; then the black one, 
then the spotted one, and so on; also of Martin, her boy, and Ursula, her girl, etc. 
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To the philosopher, infinity, knowledge, movement, empirical laws, etc. are 
things just as familiar”. 
80 F. H. Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
Mendelssohn, in The Main Philosophical Writings, pp. 194–195. 
81 F. H. Jacobi, Preface to David Hume on Faith, in The Main Philosophical 
Writings, p. 541. Cf. also David Hume on Faith, in The Main Philosophical 
Writings, p. 303: “It follows that, with respect to all created beings, their rational 
cognition would have to be tested, ultimately, against their sensible one; the 
former must borrow its validity from the latter”. 
82 Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, p. 139 (Werke, II, p. 379). Cf. also ibid., p. 169 
(Werke, II, p. 410): “Jacobi reproaches the Kantian system for being a mishmash 
of idealism and empiricism. Of these two ingredients, however, it is not the 
empiricism, but the idealistic side, the side of infinity, which incurs his reproach. 
Although the side of infinity cannot win through to the perfection of the true 
nothing, still Jacobi cannot bear it because it endangers the absoluteness of the 
empirical…”; and ibid., p. 125 (Werke, II, p. 363): “Jacobi becomes as abusive 
about the nullification of this empirical truth and of faith in sense-cognition [by 
Kant] as if it were an act of sacrilege or a temple robbery”. 
83 A related diagnosis informs Hegel’s discussion of scepticism, and in particular 
his contrast between ancient and modern scepticism: for whereas he saw the 
former as a prelude to philosophy in its questioning of experience as a source for 
knowledge, he saw the latter as a form of nonphilosophy, because it leaves 
experience unquestioned, and so abandons all attempts to go beyond it. See G. W. 
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F. Hegel, “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy: Exposition of its Different 
Modifications and Comparison to the Latest Form with the Ancient One”, trans. 
by H. S. Harris, in George di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, eds., Between Kant and 
Hegel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985) (Werke, II, pp. 213–272). Cf. also Hegel, 
Encyclopaedia Logic, section 39, p. 80 (Werke, VIII, p. 112): “In Humean 
scepticism, the truth of the empirical, the truth of feeling and intuition, is taken as 
basic; and, on that basis, he attacks all universal determinations and laws, 
precisely because they have no justification by way of sense-perception. The old 
scepticism was so far removed from making feeling, or intuition, into the 
principle of truth that it turned itself against the sensible in the very first place 
instead.” 
84 Jacobi, Preface to David Hume on Faith, Main Philosophical Writings, p. 569. 
85 Ibid., p. 568. 
86 Cf. ibid., p. 569, where Jacobi talks of reason as a “different faculty of 
perception” from ordinary experience, which is a “spiritual eye” that gives us 
access to “spiritual objects”; but this does not tell us how it is these “spiritual 
objects’ stand in relation to the “visible and tangible” ones, and thus how our faith 
in the latter can remain “immediate”, once our “spiritual eye” is opened. 
87 Hegel himself seems to remark on this conflict when he notes that Jacobi 
speaks of faith (Glaube) in relation to God, but also in relation to our awareness 
of our bodies and outer objects (cf. Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza, 
in Main Philosophical Writings, p. 231), and comments: “Hence the expression 
faith, which had a deep significance in religion, is made use of for different 
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contents of every kind; this in our time is the point of view most commonly 
adopted” (Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, III, p. 419 (Werke, XX, 
p. 324)). 
88 Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, section 40, p. 80 (Werke, VIII, p. 112). Cf. also 
Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, p. 103 (Werke, II, p. 341): “…Kant’s most 
important result [as against Jacobi] will always remain this: these relations of the 
finite (whether they are relations within the sphere of the subject alone, or 
relations of things as well) are nothing in themselves, and cognition in accordance 
with them is only a cognition of appearances, (even though it becomes absolute 
because it is not to be transcended).” 
89 Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 41 addition, pp. 82–83 (Werke, VIII, pp. 
115–116). Cf. also Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, section 246 addition, I, pp. 200-
201 (Werke, IX, p. 19), translation modified: “Intelligence does not of course 
familiarizes itself with things in their sensuous existence. In that it thinks them, it 
sets their content within itself, and to practical ideality, which for itself is mere 
negativity, it adds form, universality so to speak, and so gives affirmative 
determination to the negative of particularity. This universality of things is not 
something subjective and belonging to us; it is, rather, the noumenon as opposed 
to the transient phenomenon, the truth, objectivity, and actual being of the things 
themselves. It resembles the platonic ideas, which do not have their being 
somewhere in the beyond, but which exist in individual things as substantial 
genera. Proteus will only be compelled into telling the truth if he is roughly 
handled, and we are not content with sensuous appearance. The inscription on the 
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veil of Isis, ‘I am what was, is, and shall be, and my veil has been lifted by no 
mortal’, melts before thought”; G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to the Lectures on 
the History of Philosophy, trans. by T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), p. 90 (Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, ed. 
by Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamberg: Meiner, 1940), p. 121): “A thought is the 
universal as such; even in nature we find thoughts present as its species and laws, 
and thus they are not merely present in the form of consciousness, but absolutely 
and therefore objectively. The reason of the world is not subjective reason. 
Thought is what is substantive and true, in comparison with the singular which is 
momentary, passing, and transient. Knowledge of the nature of thought removes 
the subjective mode of its appearance, and then this means that thought is not 
something particular, subjective, belonging to our consciousness merely, but is 
the universal, objective absolutely”. 
90 Cf. Pippin, “Hegel’s Original Insight”, p. 288, note 5: “…such an interpretation 
[of Hegel as a concept realist] still makes Hegel a fundamentally pre-critical 
philosopher, committed to the basic rationalist dream shattered by Kant. Hegel’s 
many remarks about ‘completing’ the Kantian revolution, or celebrating the 
modern ‘principles of subjectivity,’ are very hard to understand on such a reading. 
It is as if Hegel simply missed the point, the massive, unavoidable point, of the 
Critique of Pure Reason”. 
91 There is little indication that Hegel had any patience for appeals to modesty of 
this kind. Cf. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, I, p. 277 (Werke, 
XVIII, p. 318): “It shows excessive humility of mind to believe that knowledge 
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[das Erkennen] has no value; but Christ says, ‘Are ye not better than the 
sparrows?’, and we are so inasmuch as we are thinking; as sensuous we are as 
good or bad as sparrows”; and Lectures on the History of Philosophy, I, p. xliii 
(Werke, XVIII, pp. 13–14): “The love of truth, faith in the power of mind, is the 
first condition in Philosophy. Man, because he is Mind, should and must deem 
himself worthy of the highest; he cannot think too highly of the greatness and the 
power of his mind, and, with this belief, nothing will be so difficult and hard that 
it will not reveal itself to him. The Being of the universe, at first hidden and 
concealed, has no power which can offer resistance to the search for knowledge; 
it has to lay itself open before the seeker – to set before his eyes and give for his 
enjoyment, its riches and its depths”. 
92 Cf. Hegel’s claim against Jacobi, that the latter sets up an unworkable antithesis 
between immediacy and mediation: cf. Encyclopaedia Logic, sections 65–67, pp. 
114–116 (Werke, VIII, pp. 155–158), and Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
III, p. 421 (Werke, XX, p. 328): “This opposition between immediacy and 
mediacy is thus a very barren and quite empty determination; it is a platitude of 
the extremest type to consider anything like this to be a true opposition; it 
proceeds from a most wooden understanding, which thinks that an immediacy can 
be something on its own account, without a mediation within itself”. 
93 Cf. Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 47, p. 90: “… Kant himself makes cognition 
in general, and even experience, consist in the fact that our perceptions are 
thought, i.e. that the determinations which first belong to perception are 
transformed into thought-determinations” (Werke, VIII, p. 125). Cf. also 
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Encyclopaedia Logic, section 20 and  section 24 addition, pp. 51, 57–58 (Werke, 
VIII, p. 74, p. 83): “Kant employed the awkward expression, that I ‘accompany’ 
all my representations – and my sensations, desires, actions, etc., too… ‘I’ is the 
existence of the entirely abstract universality, the abstractly free. Therefore ‘I’ is 
thinking as the subject, and since at the same time I am in all my sensations, 
notions, states, etc., thought is present everywhere and pervades all these 
determinations as [their] category…./ In the ‘I’ there is a manifold inner and outer 
content, and, according to the way in which this content is constituted, we behave 
as sensing, representing, remembering, [beings], etc. But the ‘I’ is there in all of 
these, or, in other words, thinking is present everywhere. Thus man is always 
thinking, even when he simply intuits”. This is arguably also the moral of Hegel’s 
discussion of sense-certainty in the Phenomenology, where once again the target 
may plausibly be taken to be Jacobi’s empiricism, which per impossibile tries to 
avoid all comprehension in favour of sheer apprehension: see Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 58–66 (Werke, III, pp. 82–92). 
94 Cf. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy III, p. 176 (Werke, XX, p. 79); 
translation modified: “The empirical is not merely an observing, hearing, feeling, 
etc., a perception of the individual; for it really sets to work to find the species, 
the universal, to discover laws. Now because it does this, it comes within the 
territory of the Notion – it begets what pertains to the region of the Idea…. The 
demand of a priori knowledge, which seems to imply that the Idea should 
construct from itself, is thus a reconstruction only”. 
95 Ameriks, “Hegel and Idealism”, pp. 394–395. 
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96 Ibid., p. 395. 
97 In his later article, “Introduction: Interpreting German Idealism”, p. 8, Ameriks 
himself seems to recognize the legitimacy of thinking of idealism in this way. For 
further discussion, see my Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object (London: 
Routledge, 1990), ch. 5. 
98 Michael Rosen, “From Vorstellung to Thought: Is a ‘Non-Metaphysical’ View 
of Hegel Possible?’, in Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (eds), 
Metaphysik nach Kant? (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), pp. 248-262, at p. 262; 
reprinted in Robert Stern (ed.), G. W. F. Hegel: Critical Assessments, 4 vols. 
(London: Routledge, 1993), III, pp. 329-344, at p. 343. For further discussion of 
this way of taking Hegel’s idealism, see Robert Stern, Hegel, Kant and the 
Structure of the Object (London: Routledge, 1990), esp. ch. V, and the other 
papers collected in Robert Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009).  
99 Cf. Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 51 (Werke, V, p. 45): “Thought is an expression 
which attributes the determinations contained therein primarily to consciousness. 
But inasmuch as it is said that understanding, reason, is in the objective world, 
that mind and nature have universal laws to which their life and changes conform, 
then it is conceded that the determinations of thought equally have objective value 
and existence”; Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic,  section 24 addition, p. 57 (Werke, 
VIII, p. 82): “Just as thinking constitutes the substance of external things, so it is 
also the universal substance of what is spiritual… If we regard thinking as what is 
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genuinely universal in everything natural and everything spiritual, too, then it 
overgrasps all of them and is the foundation of them all”. 
100 I am grateful to David Bell, Fred Beiser, Paul Franks, Sebastian Gardner, Rolf-
Peter Horstmann and James Kreines for very helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper. I would also like to acknowledge the support of the Arts 
and Humanities Research Council, for funding the research leave during which 
this paper was written. 
